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Abstract	
For	a	 long	 time,	 the	Venezuelan	democracy	was	an	exception	 in	South	America	due	 to	a	
party	system	that	was	based	on	what	was	known	as	the	‘Punto	Fijo	Pact’.	At	the	start	of	the	
1980s	a	series	of	economic,	social	and	political	events	began	to	occur,	which	caused	this	
‘exceptionalism’	 to	 stagger	 and	disrupt	 the	 institutionality	 of	 the	 traditional	 Venezuelan	
democratic	State.	The	events	led	to	a	deep	national	crisis	and	the	birth	of	a	new	political	era.	
By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	there	had	been	a	significant	shift	towards	left‐wing	governance.	
Hugo	 Chávez	 Frías	 subsequently	 won	 the	 presidential	 elections	 in	 1998.	 This	 paper	
analyzes	some	aspects	of	the	criminal	policies	that	were	implemented	during	the	reign	of	
left‐wing	leader	Chávez	till	his	death	in	2013	and	thereafter	by	Chavist	party	president	elect,	
Nicolás	 Maduro	 during	 2013‐2014.	 Four	 stages	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	
incarceration	rates.	The	 first	 stage,	 from	1999	 to	2000,	was	characterized	by	 the	 lowest	
recordings	 of	 incarceration	 rates	 and	 the	 lowest	 measured	 percentage	 of	 preventive	
detention	in	Venezuela	in	thirty	years.	The	second	stage,	from	2001	to	2005,	saw	a	slight	
increase	in	the	incarceration	rate	which	then	remained	stable.	The	third	stage,	from	2006	
to	2012,	and	the	fourth	stage,	from	2013	to	2014,	are	characterized	by	sustained	increases	
in	preventive	detention,	incarceration	and	murder	rates.	
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From	a	representative	democracy	to	a	participative	and	protagonist	democracy	
For	a	long	time,	the	Venezuelan	democracy	was	an	exception	in	South	America,	due	to	a	party	
system	 that	was	based	on	what	was	 known	as	 the	 ‘Punto	Fijo	 Pact’.	 The	 system	 involved	 the	
exchange	of	presidential	power	between	two	parties,	Democratic	Action	and	COPEI	(also	called	
Social	 Christian	 Party	 (Partido	 Socialcristiano)	 or	 Green	 Party	 (Partido	 Verde)),	 and	 the	
distribution	 of	 statewide	 power	 quotas.	 Even	 though	we	 can	 say	 that	 this	 formal	 democracy	
appeared	to	be	different	from	the	other	dictatorships	in	the	Southern	Cone	(the	geographic	region	
composed	 of	 the	 southernmost	 areas	 of	 South	 America,	 south	 of	 and	 around	 the	 Tropic	 of	
Capricorn),	the	ruling	governments	still	persecuted	and	murdered	political	opposition	members	
and	leaders	within	leftist	organizations.	
	
At	the	start	of	the	1980s	a	series	of	economic,	social	and	political	events	began	to	occur,	which	
caused	 this	 ‘exceptionalism’	 to	 stagger	 and	 disrupt	 the	 institutionality	 of	 the	 traditional	
Venezuelan	 democratic	 State.	 The	 events	 led	 to	 a	 deep	 national	 crisis	 and	 the	 birth	 of	 a	 new	
political	 era.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 there	 had	 been	 a	 significant	 shift	 towards	 left‐wing	
governance.	Hugo	Chávez	Frías	subsequently	won	the	presidential	elections	in	1998	with	56.2	
per	cent	of	the	votes,	leading	a	broad	civic‐military	movement	of	a	progressive	and	nationalist	
nature.	 The	 movement	 mobilized	 and	 brought	 together	 various	 sectors	 of	 society	 that	 were	
looking	to	create	change	by	rejecting	previous	neoliberal	policies.	
	
When	Chávez	took	power	he	established	a	regulatory	review	of	existing	laws	that	privileged	the	
economic	elites	and	passed	laws	in	favor	of	the	most	vulnerable	and	excluded	groups.	However,	
these	changes	created	a	climate	of	polarization	and	conflict	due	to	resistance	to	the	loss	of	power	
from	the	economic,	political,	media,	religious	and	labor	groups	that,	up	until	that	time,	had	been	
privileged	(López	2002).	The	situation	 finally	escalated	 into	a	general	strike	organized	by	 the	
opposition,	which	ended	in	a	coup	in	April	2002.	In	addition,	a	powerful	general	strike	known	as	
the	oil	strike	or	oil	lockout	was	organized,	which,	together	with	efforts	to	sabotage	the	restart	of	
oil	production,	aimed	to	paralyze	the	main	economic	activity	of	the	country.		
	
From	2004	onward	the	population,	which	suffered	from	poverty,	begins	to	push	for	the	removal	
of	privileges	and	the	implementation	of	strong	measures	for	the	redistribution	of	wealth.	As	a	
result,	 the	 Bolivarian	 government	 led	 by	 Chávez	 became	 increasingly	 more	 entrenched	 and	
popular	amongst	the	working	class.	As	Biardeau	(2007)	points	out,	to	bet	on	Bolivarian	socialism	
meant	to	change	life	and	the	subjectivity	configured	from	the	logic	of	capital,	the	development	of	
human	potential	through	praxis,	not	from	changes	beyond	the	subjective	level.	
	
Subsequent	elections	showed	strong	Chavist	victories,	while	support	for	Bolivarianism	continued	
to	 strengthen	 in	 all	 elections	 from	 1998	 onward,	 consolidating	 the	 movement	 as	 the	 most	
important	political	force	in	the	country	(López	2009:	33).	But	after	winning	the	referendum	in	
2009	 that	 guaranteed	 Chávez	 the	 opportunity	 to	 run	 for	 a	 third	 term,	 he	 died	 in	 2013	 after	
battling	cancer.		Another	presidential	election	was	therefore	held	and	the	Chavist	party	candidate,	
Nicolás	Maduro,	won	by	a	narrow	margin.	Today	the	Bolivarian	process	faces	great	challenges:	
the	continuity	of	progressive	leftist	policies	that	were	developed	during	the	Chávez	government;	
overcoming	 a	 powerful	 economic	 war;	 and	 curbing	 urban	 violence	 and	 people’s	 feelings	 of	
insecurity.	
	
This	 paper	 analyzes	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 criminal	 policies	 that	were	 implemented	 during	 the	
Bolivarian	 political	 process	 until	 2014.	 Four	 stages	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	
incarceration	 rates.	 The	 first	 stage,	 from	 1999	 to	 2000,	 was	 characterized	 by	 the	 lowest	
recordings	of	incarceration	rates	(see	Figures	1	and	2)	and	the	lowest	measured	percentage	of	
preventive	detention	in	Venezuela	in	thirty	years.	The	second	stage,	from	2001	to	2005,	saw	a	
slight	increase	in	the	incarceration	rate	which	then	remained	stable.	The	third	stage,	from	2006	
to	2012,	and	the	fourth	stage,	 from	2013	to	2014,	are	characterized	by	sustained	increases	 in	
preventive	detention,	incarceration	and	murder	rates.	
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Figure	1:	Total	prison	population	in	Venezuela,	1992‐2014		
Source:	Dirección	Nacional	de	Servicios	Penitenciarios	(1992‐2011);	Ministerio	del	Poda	Popular	para	el	
Servicio	Penitenciario	(2013).	Data	from	2013	correspond	to	the	month	of	July	and,	from	2014,	until	August	
	
	
Figure	2:	Incarceration	rate	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	Venezuela,	1992‐2014		
Source:	Dirección	Nacional	de	Servicios	Penitenciarios	(1992‐2011);	Ministerio	del	Poda	Popular	para	el	
Servicio	Penitenciario	(2013).	Data	from	2013	correspond	to	the	month	of	July	and,	from	2014,	until	August	
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The	paper	presents	an	analysis	of	the	reforms	of	the	Organic	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure	and	the	
Penal	code	reforms	during	each	stage;	the	political	context	in	which	they	were	approved;	and	the	
discourse	that	accompanied	these	initiatives	of	the	State’s	public	authorities.	
	
First	stage:	1999	and	2000	
The	first	two	years	of	the	Chávez	Government	of	the	Bolivarian	Revolution,	which	implemented	
the	Organic	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure	(OCCP)	in	1998,	recorded	the	most	significant	decrease	
in	incarceration	rates	over	the	preceding	30	years.	The	OCCP	transformed	the	nature	of	criminal	
proceedings	from	inquisitorial	to	accusatorial,	and	established	‘trial	in	freedom’	as	a	general	rule.	
In	addition,	preventive	detention	became	an	exception,	in	contrast	to	the	governance	during	the	
previous	 Code	 of	 Criminal	 Procedure.	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 drastic	 decrease	 can	 be	 observed	 in	
incarceration	rates,	from	104	per	100	thousand	inhabitants	in	1998	to	69	people	per	100,000	
inhabitants	in	2000	(Figure	2).	
	
These	 changes	 occurred	with	 a	 government	 that,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 Venezuelan	 democratic	
history,	 was	 not	 aligned	 with	 the	 hegemonic	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 actors’	 interests.	
Another	important	aspect	was	the	existence	of	a	new	constitution,	which	had	been	approved	in	a	
referendum.	The	new	constitution	held	trial	in	freedom	as	a	principle,	one	that	inspired	the	OCCP.	
The	constitution	additionally	aimed	to	create	a	prison	system	that	ensured	the	rehabilitation	of	
inmates	and	assurance	of	detainees’	human	rights	by	sentencing	detainees	to	punishments	that	
did	not	require	the	restriction	of	liberty.		
	
Also	for	the	first	time	in	30	years,	the	number	of	convicted	detainees	was	higher	than	the	number	
of	 accused	 detainees.	 The	 ratio	 of	 prosecuted	 prisoners	 (convicted)	 to	 provisional	 (indicted)	
detainees	changed	from	58.5	to	41.5	in	1998,	to	38.4	to	61.6	in	2000	(see	Figure	3).	
	
	
Figure	3:	Composition	of	the	prison	population	according	to	legal	status,	1992‐2014	
Source:	Dirección	Nacional	de	Servicios	Penitenciarios	(1992‐2011);	Ministerio	del	Poda	Popular	para	el	
Servicio	Penitenciario	(2013).	Data	from	2013	correspond	to	the	month	of	July	and,	from	2014,	until	August	
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The	decrease	in	incarceration	rates	coincided	with	not	only	a	slight	decrease	of	the	main	types	of	
crime	but	also	with	an	increase	in	the	homicide	rate.	Although	this	increase	in	the	homicide	rate	
had	been	a	trend	since	1989,	it	accelerated	during	the	early	years	of	the	Bolivarian	Revolution	
when	crime	rates	decreased	 from	1,030	per	100,000	 inhabitants	 in	1998	 to	977	 in	2000	(see	
Figure	4),	while	homicides	rates	increased	in	the	same	period	from	20	per	100,000	inhabitants	
to	33	(Figure	5)	(Documento	de	la	Gran	Misión	a	Toda	Vida	Venezuela	2012).	
	
	
Figure	4:	Major	crime	rates	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	Venezuela,	1992‐2011	
Source:	Compiled	from	data	from	Documento	de	la	Gran	Misión	a	Toda	Vida	Venezuela	(2012),	with	data	
provided	by	the	CICPC	
	
	
Figure	5:	Homicide	rate	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	Venezuela,	1989‐2010.	
Source:	Compiled	from	data	from	the	Cuerpo	de	Investigaciones	Científicas,	Penales	y	Criminalísticas	
(CICPC)	and	the	founding	document	of	the	Documento	de	la	Gran	Misión	a	Toda	Vida	Venezuela	(2012)	
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With	the	increase	in	the	homicide	rate,	the	general	public	perception	of	insecurity	also	increased.	
The	discourse	debates	that	followed	blamed	the	OCCP	for	the	growth	in	violence	and	called	for	
reforms	 that	 would	 restrict	 trial	 in	 freedom	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 alternative	 punitive	
methods.	
	
In	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 the	 Chavist	 movement	 grappled	 with	 recognizing	 the	 social	 and	
economic	inequalities	that	prevailed	in	society	and	the	inadequate	implementation	of	the	OCCP	
as	the	causes	for	the	increase	in	violence	(Asamblea	Nacional	2000:	26‐27).	Although	the	OCCP	
was	not	 formally	questioned,	a	plea	was	held	 for	 the	restriction	of	procedural	benefits.	These	
benefits	were	said	to	lead	to	the	apparent	increase	in	impunity	and	crime,	due	to	a	lack	of	training	
of	judges	and	other	players	in	the	criminal	justice	system	(Asamblea	Nacional	2000:	7‐14).	Some	
minority	voices	in	the	National	Assembly	questioned	the	relationship	between	the	application	of	
the	OCCP	and	the	increase	in	crime,	and	attributed	the	difficulties	in	its	implementation	to	a	lack	
of	 resources.	 From	 the	 minority’s	 point	 of	 view,	 resources	 were	 necessary	 to	 adapt	 the	
institutionalization	of	the	criminal	justice	system	(for	example,	more	tax)	to	the	new	orientation	
of	the	OCCP	(Asamblea	Nacional	2000:	5‐6).	In	the	end	the	arguments	in	favor	of	restricting	the	
procedural	 benefits	 and	 increased	 penalties	 prevailed	 and,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 public	 concern	
about	increased	insecurity	of	certain	crimes,	the	reforms	to	the	OCCP	and	the	Penal	Code	were	
adopted	in	the	second	half	of	2000.	
	
The	 OCCP	 reform	 increased	 the	 effective	 imprisonment	 time	 by	 limiting	 compensation	
agreements	and	sentence	reduction	for	admission	of	the	facts.	It	also	broadened	and	increased	
the	use	and	legitimate	length	of	preventive	detention,	in	addition	to	lengthening	the	legal	time	
frame	to	pass	judgement	on	the	release	of	the	individual	under	arrest.	
	
With	regard	to	the	Criminal	Code,	the	reform	was	characterized	by	the	classification	of	 forced	
disappearances	in	addition	to	a	hardening	of	penalties,	mainly	for	offenses	related	to	trafficking,	
possession	of	weapons,	and	offenses	against	property	such	as	theft	in	public	transport.	
	
The	 position	 held	 by	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (SCJ)	 about	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 OCCP	 in	
relation	to	increased	crime	was	even	more	conservative	than	that	of	the	National	Assembly.	For	
Magistrate	 Alejandro	 Angulo	 Fontiveros,	 the	 OCCP’s	 benefits	 were	 spurious,	 and	 the	
implementation	of	the	Code	was	directly	related	to	increased	insecurity.	This	position	in	relation	
to	procedural	benefits	and	the	retributive	function	of	penalties	also	became	evident	in	judicial	
decisions	and	 interpretations	of	 the	 laws	made	by	 the	 SCJ	 in	which	 the	 SCJ	often	 favored	 the	
restriction	 of	 benefits	 and	 alternative	 penal	methods,	 an	 orientation	which	went	 against	 the	
constitutional	guidelines.	
	
The	representatives	of	the	Public	Ministry	and	the	National	Executive	Branch	took	a	less	punitive	
position	on	the	matter.	The	Attorney	General	of	the	Republic	was	adamant	in	affirming	that	‘it	is	
simplistic	to	argue	that	the	OCCP	is	responsible	for	the	increase	in	crime	and	that	it	only	obstructs	
criminal	law’.	He	attributed	the	difficulties	in	the	implementation	of	the	policy	to	a	lack	of	political	
will	to	allocate	the	necessary	resources	for	institutional	arrangements	by	the	State,	resources	that	
were	required	to	reform	criminal	proceedings	(Tribunal	Supremo	de	Justicia	2001;	previously	
sourced	at	http://www.tsj.gov.ve/informacion/notasprensa/2001/090501‐4.htm	but	no	
longer	available).	
	
In	the	same	vein,	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs	and	Justice	dismissed	that	the	rise	of	violence	
could	be	attributed	to	the	 implementation	of	 the	OCCP.	Instead	the	Ministry	 linked	the	rise	 to	
structural	factors	such	as	poverty	and	judicial	and	police	corruption.	President	Chávez	similarly	
related	 the	 increase	 in	 crime	 and	 violence	 to	 social	 causes,	 gearing	 his	 discourse	 toward	
improving	social	indicators	(Informes	de	Memoria	y	Cuenta	del	Presidente	de	la	República	1999,	
2000).	
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Second	stage:	2001‐2005	
The	second	stage	was	characterized	by	two	very	important	legislative	reforms;	that	of	the	OCCP	
in	2001	and	the	Criminal	Code	in	2005.	Both	initiatives	were	driven	and	approved	by	Chavism	as	
the	major	political	force	in	the	National	Assembly.3	
	
The	2001	reform,	which	had	the	largest	and	most	regressive	effect	on	the	OCCP,	brought	about	
important	modifications	to	the	principle	of	trial	in	freedom	and	the	forms	of	punishment	without	
restriction	 of	 liberty.	 The	 number	 of	 crimes	 that	 could	 result	 in	 preventative	 detention	 was	
expanded,	the	imprisonment	limit	that	could	be	considered	for	trial	in	freedom	was	decreased	
from	five	to	three	years,	and	the	factors	that	could	be	considered	as	a	flight	risk	were	increased	
(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	 2001:	 Article	 253).	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 the	maximum	
period	of	preventative	detention	was	increased	as	well	as	the	possibility	of	extending	permissible	
coercive	measures	 when	 detainees’	 release	 dates	were	 imminent,	 but	 only	when	 there	were	
considered	 to	 be	 serious	 reasons	 to	 justify	 this	 and	 the	 established	minimum	penalty	 for	 the	
offense	was	not	exceeded	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2001:	Article	244).		
	
In	 relation	 to	 forms	 of	 punishment	without	 the	 restriction	 of	 liberty,	 the	 requirements	were	
tightened,	restricting	the	scope	of	these	measures	to	the	non‐repetitive	prison	population	while	
at	 the	 same	 time	 increasing	 the	 enforcement	 of	 effective	 sentencing	 times	 to	 include	 more	
detainees	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2001:	Article	501	and	508).	Rosales	(2012)	
points	out	that	the	reform	brought	back	the	increased	policing	of	criminal	justice,	returning	to	the	
police	 apparatus	 the	 dominance	 that	 it	 had	 in	 the	 past,	 which	 occurred	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	
addressing	the	rise	in	crime	and	the	demand	of	citizens	to	control	it.	In	such	a	situation	the	police	
force	administers	punishments	and,	in	doing	so,	selects	the	clientele	of	the	penal	system.		This	
usually	 means	 targeting	 the	most	 vulnerable,	 not	 necessarily	 because	 they	 commit	 the	most	
serious	crimes	but	rather	because	of	their	greater	vulnerability	(Rosales	2006).	
	
Despite	the	modifications,	the	incarceration	rate	changed	very	little	during	this	period.	By	2001	
the	rate	stood	at	83	per	100,000	inhabitants,	an	increase	of	14	points	over	the	level	of	69	recorded	
for	2000.	 In	 the	 two	years	 that	 followed	the	 rate	remained	relatively	stable,	closing	at	81	per	
100,000	inhabitants	in	2003.	The	rate	then	began	to	decline	again,	decreasing	to	69	per	100,000	
inhabitants	in	2005,	similar	to	the	one	recorded	for	2000.	
	
The	start	of	a	downward	trend	in	the	convicted	population	and	an	upward	trend	in	prosecuted	
population	can	be	observed	from	2001	onward.	The	transformation	peaks	in	2005,	as	shown	in	
Table	1.	
	
Table	1:	Convicted	and	prosecuted	populations	in	Venezuela,	2000‐2005	
Year	 Convicted	 Prosecuted	
2000	 61,6	 38,4	
2001	 57,5	 42,5	
2002	 54,7	 45,3	
2003	 54,2	 45,8	
2004	 54,4	 45,6	
2005	 49,5	 50,5	
Source:	Based	on	data	supplied	by	the	Dirección	Nacional	de	Servicios	Penitenciarios	
	
In	the	National	Assembly,	the	opinion	matrix	that	accompanied	the	2001	OCCP	reform	process	
was	characterized	by	a	widespread	perception	of	 increased	 insecurity.	Whereas	 this	 could	be	
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explained	 by	 social	 causes	 such	 as	 poverty,	 unemployment	 and	 inequality,	 it	 also	 became	
associated	with	the	implementation	of	more	flexible	liberty‐depriving	measures	under	the	OCCP.	
President	Chávez	attributed	the	increased	perception	of	insecurity	to	the	sensationalist	handling	
of	the	topic	by	the	media	in	order	to	discredit	the	government	and	benefit	their	personal	political	
aims.	He	faced	the	crime	issue	by	maintaining	a	focus	on	addressing	social	causes,	such	as	poverty	
and	inequality	(Informes	de	Memoria	y	Cuenta	del	Presidente	de	la	República	2002).	As	a	result,	
some	segments	of	the	political	opposition	began	to	accuse	Chávez	of	being	an	accomplice	to	crime.	
	
At	the	same	time,	the	2001	reform	of	the	OCCP	occurred	in	a	context	of	high	political	conflict,	
characterized	 by	 a	 strike	 organized	 by	 the	 Venezuelan	 Federation	 of	 Chambers	 and	 the	
Confederation	of	Workers	of	Venezuela	(PDVSA)	in	2001	and	in	2002.	PDVSA	workers	also	joined	
a	second	strike,	which	rejected	the	new	oil	policy	that	aimed	to	regain	control	over	the	company	
that	had	been	the	main	source	of	income	for	the	country	and	until	then	had	worked	with	high	
levels	of	autonomy	while	benefitting	private	interests.	Additionally,	a	coup	took	place	in	2002,	
which	was	 immediately	 reversed	 thanks	 to	grassroots	mobilization	supported	by	 the	military	
sectors	 that	 defended	 the	 constitutional	 order,	 after	 which	 President	 Chávez	 returned	 to	 his	
official	duties.	This	increased	the	levels	of	conflict	in	the	months	that	followed	and,	in	2003,	the	
opposition	abandoned	their	insurrectional	approach	and	assumed	an	institutional	approach,	as	
envisioned	in	the	Constitution,	to	advocate	for	a	change	in	government.	They	did	so	by	calling	for	
a	referendum	in	order	to	decide	whether	President	Chávez	should	be	recalled	from	office.	The	
referendum	was	held	in	2004	and	resulted	in	the	ratification	of	the	President.	
	
Security	during	this	period	of	major	political	unrest	was	characterized	by	increased	homicide	and	
crime	rates	(see	Table	2)	and	a	move	away	from	the	years	of	stability	previously	enjoyed	by	the	
Chavez	government.	
	
Table	2:	Homicide	and	crime	rates	in	Venezuela,	2000‐2005	
Year	 Homicide	rate	 Crime	rate	
2000	 33	 977	
2001	 35	 915	
2002	 42	 1,041	
2003	 49	 1,034	
2004	 37	 902	
2005	 37	 877	
Source:	Cuerpo	de	Investigaciones	Científicas,	Penales	y	Criminalísticas	(CICPC)	
	
Although	these	indicators	reflect	a	decrease	in	homicide	and	crime	rates,	a	new	amendment	to	
the	 Criminal	 Code	 was	 adopted	 which	 created	 new	 criminal	 offenses	 in	 2005.	 The	 reform	
hardened	prison	sentences	and	 limited	alternative	measures	 to	 liberty	restriction	 for	offenses	
that	were	considered	to	be	serious	crimes,	which	corresponded	largely	with	the	majority	of	crime	
occurrences.	 Theft	 sentences	 were	 increased	 from	 6	 months‐3	 years,	 to	 1‐5	 years.	 Robbery	
sentences	were	also	increased	from	4‐8	years,	to	a	prison	term	of	6‐12	years.	In	the	same	vein,	
some	crimes	were	banned	from	potential	procedural	benefits	and	alternative	methods	to	serving	
a	sentence.	As	Rosales	(2006)	points	out:	
	
…	 a	 parliamentary	 review	 board	 proposed	 a	 partial	 ‘punctual’	 reform	 [which]	
dismantled	the	system	and	increased	the	repression	and	indictment	in	areas	that,	
without	serious	thought,	were	felt	to	need	to	be	addressed.	As	a	consequence,	the	
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reform	added	to	the	already	dramatic	legislative	disorder	which	had	been	present	
throughout	Venezuelan	criminal	legislation	for	decades.	(Rosales	2012:	184)	
	
The	President	of	 the	Republic	argued	against	 the	proposed	amendments	 to	 the	Criminal	Code	
and,	with	the	use	of	his	presidential	veto,	maintained	the	recognition	of	non‐liberty	restricting	
measures	as	an	acquired	rights.	Non‐liberty	restricting	measures	thus	prevailed	over	restrictive	
measures	under	the	hallowed	rights	in	the	Constitution	and,	in	doing	so,	warned	of	a	prison	crisis	
that	had	the	potential	to	lead	to	the	removal	of	these	benefits.	Meanwhile,	the	Public	Prosecutor’s	
Office	expressed	their	refusal	of	 the	reform	by	presenting	an	appeal	 for	annulment	before	the	
Constitutional	 Chamber	 of	 the	 SCJ,	 leaning	 towards	 a	 protective	 discourse	 and	 minimalist	
criminal	law	while	questioning	the	effectiveness	of	increased	penalties	as	a	strategy	to	combat	
insecurity,	a	measure	that	historically	has	resulted	in	the	incarceration	of	the	poorest	while	the	
major	economic	powers	involved	in	the	crime	could	count	on	impunity.	The	Public	Prosecutor’s	
Office	additionally	denounced	that	the	modifications	made	to	the	precautionary	measures	and	
alternative	forms	of	punishment	went	against	the	Constitution	and	the	OCCP.	And	lastly,	it	drew	
attention	to	the	potential	prison	crisis	as	a	consequence	of	the	reform	(Diario	El	Nacional	2005).	
	
Conversely,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 held	 a	 conservative	 view	 and	 was	 disposed	 towards	 the	
restriction	of	flexible	punishment	measures.	With	regard	to	the	legal	or	constitutional	nature	of	
the	procedural	benefits,	the	Supreme	Court	was	inclined	to	define	them	as	benefits	with	a	legal	
character	 rather	 than	 fundamental	 rights,	which	meant	 that	 the	 procedural	 benefits	 could	 be	
awarded	with	differential	 treatment	 depending	on	 the	 gravity	of	 the	offense	 (Judgment	 1654	
2005).	 This	 differential	 treatment	was	 justified	 by	 arguing	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
individual	 rights	 of	 the	 offending	 individual	 and	 collective	 rights	 of	 society	 (Judgment	 3067	
2005).	
	
The	National	Assembly	 for	 its	part,	even	though	it	had	declared	 it	would	adopt	the	comments	
made	 by	 President	 Chávez,	 in	 practice	 welcomed	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 and	
maintained	 the	 text	 of	 the	 amendment	 made	 to	 the	 Penal	 Code.	 The	 amendment	 included	
limitations	to	the	access	to	procedural	benefits	and	alternative	punishment	measures	for	crimes	
that	were	considered	serious	(La	Gaceta	2005).	With	this	amendment	to	the	Criminal	Code	 in	
2005,	 the	prison	population	that	was	awaiting	sentencing	 increased	significantly,	 returning	to	
levels	similar	to	those	measured	during	the	Fourth	Republic.	This	meant	that	the	progress	made	
during	the	first	years	of	the	Chavist	government	was	gradually	crumbling.	
	
Third	stage:	2006‐2012	
Four	reforms	to	the	OCCP	were	realized	in,	respectively,	2006,	2008,	2009	and	2012.	The	first	
three	initiatives	were	driven	by	the	Chavist	movement	within	the	National	Assembly	and	the	last	
was	approved	directly	by	the	President	of	the	Republic	through	a	constitutional	exercise	of	power	
performed	under	an	Enabling	Law.	The	critics	within	the	opposition	focused	on	highlighting	the	
structural	 problems	 of	 the	 prison	 system,	 such	 as	 overcrowding,	 poor	 infrastructure	 and	
procedural	delays,	claiming	that	the	issues	in	the	prison	system	were	not	going	to	be	solved	by	
the	reforms,	but	rather	that	some	modifications	might	aggravate	them	even	further.	
	
While	the	reforms	claimed	to	ease	the	restrictions	adopted	in	the	2001	OCCP	reform,	they	did	not	
modify	 the	 scope	 of	 preventative	 detention	 but	 rather	 focused	 on	 the	measures	 that	 allowed	
detainees	 to	 serve	 an	 alternative	 punishment.	 The	 increased	 incarceration	 and	 detained	
individual	rates	substantiate	this	claim.		
	
The	2006	 reform	made	 the	access	 to	 alternative	punishment	measures	more	 flexible,	 such	as	
working	 outside	 the	 prison,	 probation	 and	 an	 open	 penitentiary	 system,	 and	 by	 allowing	
individuals	with	a	criminal	record	to	again	become	eligible	for	these	benefits	(Reforma	Código	
Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2006:	Article	500).	Additionally,	it	repealed	the	requirement	that	certain	
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offenses	 had	 to	 serve	 at	 least	 half	 their	 imposed	 sentence	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 Conditional	
Suspension	of	Execution	of	Sentences;	instead	they	had	to	meet	the	same	requirements	as	any	
other	 crime	 (Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	 1998:	Article	 493).	As	 for	 sentence	 remission	 in	
relation	to	work	and	study,	it	was	decided	that	the	redeemed	time	should	be	calculated	from	the	
start	of	the	time	served,	not	from	after	serving	half	of	the	sentence,	as	had	been	the	case	in	the	
2001	reforms	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2006:	Article	507).		
	
The	 discourses	 that	 accompanied	 this	 reform	within	 the	 National	 Assembly	mainly	 revolved	
around	the	need	to	reduce	the	procedural	delays,	to	decongest	the	courts	and	prisons	and,	to	a	
lesser	extent,	to	enhance	rehabilitation	possibilities,	which	as	stated	in	the	constitution	should	
direct	the	prison	system	governance.	
	
The	incarceration	rate	for	this	year	remained	the	same	as	that	recorded	in	2005	(69	per	100,000	
inhabitants).	However,	the	percentage	of	detainees	in	preventive	detention	increased	to	57.3	per	
cent	which	aggravated	the	prison	situation,	causing	several	prison	strikes	that	resulted	in	deaths	
and	 injuries.	 The	 most	 common	means	 of	 protest	 were	 hunger	 strikes,	 self‐kidnappings	 and	
people	 resorting	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 sewing	 their	 lips	 together.	 In	 this	 period	 prison	 deaths	
increased	from	381	in	2005,	to	388	in	2006,	to	458	in	2007	(see	Figure	6).	The	number	of	injuries	
increased	from	721	in	2005,	to	934	 in	2006,	to	1,103	in	2007	(Dirección	Nacional	de	Servicios	
Penitenciarios	n.d.).	
	
	
Figure	6:	Number	of	detainees	injured	and	killed,	2005‐2009	
Source:	Dirección	Nacional	de	Servicios	Penitenciarios	
	
The	political	context	in	which	the	reform	took	place	was	characterized	by	presidential	elections,	
in	which	President	Hugo	Chávez	ran	for	re‐election	and	won	with	a	62.8	per	cent	majority.	From	
that	moment	onward	Chávez	adopted	a	series	of	measures	to	consolidate	forces	by	creating	the	
United	Socialist	Party	of	Venezuela,	which	included	key	leaders	of	other	parties	who	supported	
him.	This	allowed	him	to	enter	the	political	and	legislative	sphere	and	consolidate	the	necessary	
reforms	 related	 to	 the	 proposed	 improvements	 in	 the	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 of	 the	
population.		
	
Between	 2005	 and	 2006	 three	 events	 shook	 Venezuelan	 society	 which,	 especially	 at	 a	
governmental	level,	triggered	alarm.	This	resulted	from	the	involvement	of	police	officers	in	the	
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killing	of	a	group	of	students,	the	kidnapping	and	murder	of	a	well‐known	businessman,	and	the	
killing	of	three	teenage	brothers.	From	that	moment,	there	is	a	clear	demarcation	in	the	policies	
directing	the	security	forces.	The	implemented	actions	were	not	the	result	of	social	demands	or	
public	demonstrations	–	although	we	cannot	deny	their	influence	–	but	were	conceptualized	from	
above.	 In	other	words,	 it	was	 the	government	 itself	 that	occasioned	significant	changes	 in	 the	
security	policies,	focusing	on	combating	police	corruption	and	working	towards	a	strong	political	
control	of	public	institutions	and	the	police	forces.		
	
Consequently,	a	Police	Reform	Commission	(Conarepol)	was	created	in	2006.	It	resulted	in	the	
discontinuance	 of	 one	 of	 the	 most	 questionable	 police	 forces,	 the	 Metropolitan	 Police,	 and	
replacement	by	the	Bolivarian	National	Police	Corps.	At	the	same	time	the	National	Experimental	
University	of	Security	developed	a	new	policing	model,	which	upheld	the	same	ideas	in	terms	of	
the	enactment	of	laws	by	police	and	continued	to	hold	a	predominantly	preventive	character.	It	
is	also	important	to	mention	the	creation	of	the	General	Police	Council,	which	was	responsible	for	
the	design	of	public	policies	in	terms	of	policing	necessary	for	the	implementation	of	the	police	
reform	(Conarepol	2006a,	2006b,	2006c;	Díaz	and	González	2014).	
	
During	2006,	the	homicide	rate	increased	by	8	points	compared	to	the	levels	recorded	for	2004	
and	2005,	 to	 settle	 at	 45	per	100.000	 inhabitants.	 The	2004	and	2005	 levels	 stood	at	 37	per	
100,000	inhabitants,	after	experiencing	a	peak	of	44	in	2003.	
	
According	 to	 the	 Study	 of	 Criminal	 Victimization	 and	 Police	 Perception	 conducted	 by	 the	
Conarepol	in	2006,	the	most	frequent	crimes	were	robbery,	in	all	its	forms,	with	a	rate	of	3881.5	
per	100,000	(43.1	per	cent	of	crimes)	and	theft,	with	a	rate	of	2057.9	per	100,000	(22.9	per	cent	
of	crimes).	These	were	followed	by	the	crime	of	threats,	with	a	rate	of	889.2	per	100,000	(9.9	per	
cent);	 and	 personal	 injury,	 with	 a	 rate	 of	 434.5	 per	 100,000	 (4.8	 per	 cent).	 The	 overall	
victimization	rate	stood	at	8,986.4	per	100,000,	higher	than	the	official	national	rate	for	all	crimes	
in	the	country	situated	at	1,010	per	100,000.	
	
In	 2008,	 the	 OCCP	 was	 reformed	 once	 again.	 The	 reform	 consisted	 of	 a	 modification	 to	 the	
proportionality	 principle,	 whereby	 detention	 could	 not	 be	 imposed	 if	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	
offense	was	disproportionate	to	the	circumstances	of	its	commission	and	the	probable	penalty.	It	
additionally	stated	that	the	minimum	sentence	of	more	serious	crimes	should	in	some	cases	take	
the	personal	coercion	limit	as	a	minimal	sentence,	but	should	in	no	case	exceed	two	years.	Prior	
to	 2008	 there	was	 no	 established	 standard,	 so	 the	 judge	 had	more	 discretion.	 Undue	 delays	
attributable	to	the	accused	or	his	defense	were	also	viewed	as	a	situation	that	could	result	in	the	
extension	of	personal	coercion.	
	
The	 discourse	 within	 the	 National	 Assembly	 that	 accompanied	 these	 initiatives	 viewed	
alternative	punishments	as	benevolent	treatments,	which	should	only	be	granted	to	those	who	
had	committed	minor	offenses.	For	those	who	committed	more	serious	crimes	the	most	desirable	
course	of	action	would	still	be	to	let	them	serve	their	full	sentence.	The	political	discourse,	in	other	
words,	 was	 torn	 between	 respecting	 human	 rights	 from	 the	 hand	 of	 penal	 guarantees,	 and	
hardline	policies	related	to	severe	criminal	law	(Asamblea	Nacional	2008:	19).	
	
President	Chávez,	 for	his	part,	 argued	 that	prisons	were	 the	deposits	of	 the	poor	 all	 over	 the	
world.	In	his	eyes	the	solution	to	the	difficult	issue	lay	with	the	humanization	of	the	prison	system	
through	the	construction	of	inclusive	features.	In	other	words,	prisons	inmates	would	have	the	
opportunity	to	train,	study	and	work.	Later	his	discourse	changed	even	further	and	he	started	to	
problematize	the	humanization	of	prisons	to	the	point	that,	at	the	inauguration	of	a	new	prison,	
he	spoke	out	about	his	deepened	view	on	prison	issues,	referring	to	the	book	Discipline	and	Punish	
by	Michael	Foucault,	while	even	raising	the	topic	of	a	sort	of	penal	abolitionism.	
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Nevertheless,	his	discourse	did	not	produce	specific	measures	or	policies	and,	accordingly,	the	
incarceration	rate	continued	 to	climb,	especially	 for	preventative	detainees.	The	 incarceration	
rate	for	2008	was	situated	at	87	per	100,000	inhabitants,	ten	points	higher	than	that	recorded	in	
2007,	of	which	only	36.7	per	cent	of	the	prison	population	was	convicted.	Similarly,	the	homicide	
rate	continued	to	rise	and	stood	at	52	per	100,000	inhabitants.	The	crime	rate	also	increased	for	
2008	to	993	per	100,000	inhabitants.	This	followed	a	downward	trend	that	had	begun	in	2003	
and	continued	until	2007,	when	rates	started	to	rise,	from	881	to	969	per	100,000	inhabitants.	
	
In	the	electoral	political	sphere,	new	governors	and	mayors	were	elected	in	2008	in	which	the	
Chavist	 forces	 won	 22	 of	 the	 23	 governorships	 under	 dispute,	 as	 well	 as	 327	 of	 the	 335	
municipalities.	Hence,	the	Chavist	movement	continued	to	grow.	
	
In	2009	another	criminal	policy	change	occurred	when	a	new	reform	removed	the	requirement	
to	 have	 no	 former	 criminal	 record	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 conditional	 suspension	 and	 included	 a	
minimum	security	classification	prognosis	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2009:	Article	
493).	Due	to	the	modification	introduced	in	the	requirements	of	the	2006	and	2009	reforms,	the	
2001	 reform	 became	more	 flexible	with	 regard	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 accessing	 these	 benefits.	
Additionally,	 they	modified	 the	 maximum	 penalty	 from	 three	 to	 four	 years	 to	 be	 able	 to	 be	
considered	eligible	for	conditional	suspension,	although	some	forms	of	crime	remained	excluded	
such	as	crimes	against	humanity	and	drug	trafficking.	
	
The	discourse	within	the	National	Assembly	that	justified	these	initiatives	followed	from	the	need	
to	reduce	the	procedural	delays,	to	decongest	the	courts	in	order	to	speed	up	processes,	and	to	
respond	 to	 the	 prison	 issue	 (Asamblea	 Nacional	 2009b).	 However,	 the	 incarceration	 rate	
continued	 to	 rise,	 reaching	 115	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 in	 2009.	 Moreover,	 the	 convicted	
population	reached	66.9	per	cent	of	the	prison	population,	a	record	high	level	during	Bolivarian	
process	up	until	this	point.	
	
In	terms	of	security,	the	homicide	rate	fell	slightly	to	49	per	100,000	inhabitants,	and	the	crime	
rate	to	965	per	100,000	inhabitants.	The	Sociodemographic	Diagnosis	of	the	Prison	Population	
conducted	 in	2010‐2011	by	the	Superior	Prison	Council	(Consejo	Superior	Penitenciario	2011)	
noted	 that	 the	 demographic	 of	 the	 prison	 population	 had	 not	 changed	 from	 traditional	 Latin	
American	statistics,	with	an	overwhelming	majority	of	 convicts	 still	male,	 between	18	and	40	
years	of	age	(see	Figures	7)	and	belonging	to	a	lower	socioeconomic	stratum	(Figure	8).		
	
	
Figure	7:	Composition	of	the	prison	population	by	age	2010‐2011	
Source:	Sociodemographic	Diagnosis	of	the	Prison	Population	2010‐2011	(Consejo	Superior	Penitenciario	
2011)	
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Figure	8:	Composition	of	the	prison	population	by	socioeconomic	stratum,	2010‐2011	
Note:	Stratum	1	is	the	highest	socioeconomic	level;	stratum	5,	the	lowest.	
Source:	Sociodemographic	Diagnosis	of	the	Prison	Population	2010‐2011	(Consejo	Superior	Penitenciario	
2011)	
	
The	prison	population	between	2010	and	2011	consisted	of	39,694	individuals	who	were	mostly	
convicted	for	theft,	and	use	and	sale	of	small	amounts	of	drugs,	which,	although	they	often	caused	
social	unrest,	had	little	impact	on	community	life.	The	criminal	policy	could	thus	be	viewed	as	
drawing	only	on	‘traditional	crime’.	Traditional	crime	regularly	attributes	the	roles	of	victim	and	
victimizer,	in	which	the	latter	is	for	the	most	part	reserved	for	the	most	vulnerable,	exposed	to	
marginalization	and	poverty.	They	thus	reproduce	the	existing	structural	inequality	in	which	only	
certain	groups	are	considered	as	potential	offenders	on	the	basis	of	their	social	and	economic	
conditions	due	to	the	structural	orientation	of	public	policies	(Ayos	2013).	
	
The	 Chavist	 forces	 reaffirmed	 themselves	 again	 when	 President	 Chávez	 called	 for	 another	
referendum	to	approve	a	constitutional	amendment	in	2009	that	would	allow	for	him	to	be	re‐
elected	for	a	third	term.	He	won	with	54.86	per	cent	of	the	votes.	From	that	moment	onward,	and	
especially	 in	 the	 last	years	of	his	government,	 it	 can	be	noted	–	with	great	concern	–	 that	 the	
significant	advances	in	the	eradication	of	poverty	and	inequality	in	Venezuela	(see	Figure	9)	did	
not	translate	into	a	decrease	in	crime	rates.4	On	the	contrary,	there	was	an	increase	in	violent	
crimes	 and	 the	 use	 of	 firearms,	 which	 points	 to	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 social	 policies	 were	 not	
sufficient	to	deal	with	these	phenomena.	
	
Additionally,	 the	capitalist	model	began	to	be	viewed	as	a	driving	 factor	of	violence.	This	was	
because	capitalism	was	claimed	to	drive	the	need	for	recognition,	status	and	power,	especially	
among	 young	 people,	 in	 addition	 to	 selfishness,	 individualism	 and	 consumerism.	 Perhaps	 an	
explanation,	as	pointed	out	by	Antillano	(2012:	713),	is	that	the	governing	party	began	to	justify	
the	 increase	 in	crime	by	appealing	to	other	 factors	(mainly	socio‐cultural),	now	that	 the	great	
social	 reform	 and	 investment	 during	 their	 tenure	 did	 not	 have	 the	 envisioned	 impact	 on	 the	
reduction	of	violence.	Not	only	did	the	violence	not	decrease	but	it	was	increasing,	so	a	change	in	
the	lifestyles	of	the	youth	was	viewed	as	needed.	A	cultural	change	could	deal	with	the	‘cultural	
damage’,	as	President	Chávez	said	in	an	interview	that	took	place	in	2012:	
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Figure	9:	Poverty	rate	by	income	in	Venezuela,	1997‐2012	
Source:	Instituto	Nacional	de	Estadística	
	
...	even	though	today	we	have	an	education	system	...	there	is	no	more	hunger	in	
Venezuela,	opportunities	to	study	...	however,	there	is	a	percentage	of	Venezuelans	
who	suffered	during	their	childhood,	who	suffered	violent	inoculations,	because	
that	is	another	issue,	the	cultural	side,	the	films,	some	media	broadcasts	that	incite	
violence,	 violent	 toys,	 inciting	 drug	 use,	 that	 is	 a	 factor	 that	 greatly	 influences	
violence	in	the	neighbourhoods,	the	drugs,	alcoholism	...	It	is	a	cultural	deed,	it	is	
the	cultural	damage.	
	
But	the	left‐wing	discourse	of	the	President	did	not	manage	in	general	terms	to	find	party	leaders	
who	were	 capable	 of	 interpreting	 their	 ideals,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 field,	 and	 translating	 them	 into	
legislative	 proposals	 or	 penal	 policies.	 As	 a	 consequence	 the	 procedural	 reforms	 resulted	 in	
advances,	setbacks	and	an	overload	of	 criminal	agencies	due	 to	a	 lack	of	 financial	and	human	
capacity	to	respond	to	the	situation.	
	
The	reform	of	the	police	force	that	had	been	initiated	years	before	had	not	managed	to	put	a	stop	
to	the	advancements	of	crime.	Rather	one	might	view	the	proliferation	of	police	personnel	and	
police	forces	as	a	way	to	process	the	more	‘easy’	cases	by	focusing	on	common	criminal	offenses,	
and	thus	contributing	to	the	increasing	incarceration	rate,	especially	in	preventive	detention.	
	
Similarly,	the	modifications	to	the	OCCP,	even	though	they	were	attempts	to	address	procedural	
delays	and	overcrowding	in	prisons,	in	practice	did	not	change	the	scope	of	preventive	detention.	
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Preventative	 detention	 had	 been	 extended	 in	 2001	 and	 limited	 the	 access	 to	 alternative	
punishment	measures	for	those	already	convicted,	which	in	part	explains	why	the	incarceration	
rate	continued	to	rise.	
	
There	were	other	actions	that	tried	to	put	a	stop	to	the	rising	crime	rates	and	alleviate	the	serious	
prison	crisis	that	was	marked	by	high	levels	of	violence	and	overcrowding.	One	of	the	measures	
was	 the	creation	of	 the	Ministry	of	Correctional	Services	 in	2011.	Other	measures	 focused	on	
designing	security	plans	with	conventional	control	strategies	that	focused	exclusively	on	reactive	
responses	 to	 crime,	 by	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 police	 officers.	 The	 measures	 neither	
implemented	new	strategies	that	acted	beyond	the	criminal	field	nor	refocused	on	strategies	that	
had	preventive	goals	in	order	to	reduce	crime.	
	
Thus	crime	control	continued	to	focus	on	reactive	sentencing	rather	than	social	crime	prevention.	
In	 light	 of	 this	 were	 the	 security	 plans	 that	 were	 issued	 during	 this	 period	 which	 were	
characterized	by	their	situational,	reactive	and	short‐term	nature.	Even	if	they	were	structured	
to	 show	 that	 they	 benefited	 crime	 prevention	 ideas,	 in	 practice	 they	 were	 accompanied	 by	
repressive	measures	and	reactive	police	operations.	As	Garland	(2005:	85)	notes,	as	important	as	
the	 paper	was	 in	 describing	 the	 role	 that	 social	measures	 should	 play	 in	 reducing	 crime,	 the	
bureaucratic	demarcations	ultimately	determined	what	was	done.	
	
In	2012	the	last	reform	was	made	to	the	OCCP	and	the	conditional	(probationary)	suspension	of	
criminal	proceedings	for	offenses	resulting	in	a	sentence	of	maximum	eight	years	was	resumed,	
as	had	been	the	case	before	the	2001	reform.	More	serious	crimes	would	thus	potentially	become	
eligible	 for	 this	benefit,	while	at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 excluded	 those	who	had	benefited	 from	 the	
measure	in	the	previous	three	years,	thus	punishing	recidivism.	In	addition,	the	number	of	crimes	
excluded	 from	 conditional	 (probationary)	 suspension	 of	 criminal	 proceedings	was	 increased,	
especially	for	serious	offences	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2012:	Article	43).	In	a	
similar	vein,	the	requirement	of	a	maximum	penalty	of	five	years	to	suspend	criminal	action	was	
raised	 to	eight	years	 if	 it	was	a	 low	 frequency	offence	 that	did	not	 seriously	 affect	 the	public	
interest;	and	the	number	of	crimes	that	were	excluded	from	being	able	to	apply	for	the	principle	
of	 prosecutorial	 discretion	 was	 augmented	 (Reforma	 Código	 Orgánico	 Procesal	 Penal	 2012:	
Article	38).	In	relation	to	working	outside	institutions,	open	prison	regime	and	parole,	the	2012	
reform	 hardened	 the	 eligibility	 requirements	 (Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	 2012:	
Article	488).	It	was	established	that,	in	the	case	of	crimes	considered	to	be	severe,	one	could	only	
proceed	with	alternative	measures	upon	completion	of	three	quarters	of	the	original	sentence.	
	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 reform	aimed	 to	 reduce	 the	use	of	preventive	detention	and	 increase	
alternative	 measures	 for	 crimes	 which	 result	 in	 punishments	 of	 less	 than	 eight	 years	 of	
imprisonment.	Additionally,	crimes	that	were	considered	severe	were	excluded	from	potential	
benefits	or	detainees	would	have	to	opt	to	increase	their	total	sentencing	time	to	be	able	to	access	
those	benefits.	 In	spite	of	this	the	 incarceration	rate	continued	to	rise	during	2012	to	164	per	
100,000	inhabitants,	of	which	62.7	per	cent	were	convicted.	
	
Before	 the	 end	 of	 this	 period,	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 area	 of	 security	 policies	 occurred	when	
President	Chávez	created	the	Great	Mission	of	All	Life	Venezuela,	as	the	first	integral	public	policy	
in	the	field	with	a	 focus	on	humanist	and	socialist	crime	prevention.	The	plan	was	based	on	a	
structural	approach	to	crime	through	a	set	of	multifunctional	measures	with	the	intent	to	speed	
up	proceedings	while	also	making	them	accessible	to	the	population.	Additionally,	new	measures	
that	would	enable	intervening	in	minor	conflicts	by	way	of	an	alternative	punitive	system	were	
announced	(Unes	2012:	78).	
	
Even	though	President	Chávez	once	again	won	 in	 the	presidential	election	with	a	55	per	cent	
majority	 and	 Chavism	 managed	 to	 continue	 the	 consolidation	 of	 its	 forces,	 the	 attempt	 to	
implement	the	Mission	was	threatened	by	Chávez’s	serious	illness	and	subsequent	death.	
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During	 this	 period	 an	 increase	 in	 violent	 acts	 and	 homicides	 can	 be	 observed.	 The	 increase	
resulted	in	a	sustained	upward	trend	from	2004.	Despite	a	slight	decrease	in	2010	when	the	rates	
fell	from	49	to	45	homicides	per	100,000	inhabitants,	the	increase	resumed	its	growth	in	2011,	
reaching	a	rate	of	50	per	100,000	inhabitants.	
	
Fourth	stage:	2013‐2014	
The	last	period	is	marked	by	the	death	of	President	Chávez,	who	led	Venezuela	from	1999	until	
2012,	and	the	start	of	the	first	term	for	Chavist	President	Nicolás	Maduro.	Chávez’s	death	was	a	
hard	blow	for	the	country	and	resulted	in	a	large‐scale	economic	war.	The	political	opposition,	
aware	of	this	turmoil,	attempted	to	bring	about	a	change	in	the	correlation	of	forces	in	the	exercise	
of	power.	
	
In	the	presidential	elections	of	2013,	Nicolás	Maduro	won	by	a	margin	of	only	1.49	points,	which	
was	 equivalent	 to	 a	 decrease	 of	 1,599,828	 votes,	 compared	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	 presidential	
elections	six	months	earlier	when	Chávez	won	with	a	margin	of	10.76	points.	In	response,	the	
‘coup’	 sector	 of	 the	 opposition	 led	 an	 insurrectionary	 strategy	 in	 2014,	 to	 discredit	 the	 new	
government	with	the	use	of	violent	demonstrations	in	some	economically	privileged	cities	that	
were	governed	by	the	opposition.	As	a	result	of	the	violent	event,	43	people	were	killed	and	more	
than	800	people	were	injured.	
	
Additionally,	President	Maduro	faced	an	economic	war	provoked	by	national	and	international	
business	sectors	aiming	to	weaken	the	national	economy.	The	war	was	characterized	by	strong	
actions	of	hoarding,	and	speculation	on,	and	exportation	of,	the	country’s	basic	food	products,	in	
response	to	regulations	and	price	controls	imposed	by	the	State	as	a	means	of	fairer	sales	of	these	
products.	
	
What	also	shocked	the	public	was	the	murder	of	an	ex‐beauty	queen	and	her	husband	in	early	
2014.	This	resulted	in	the	issue	of	security	becoming	strongly	embedded	in	the	discourse	of	the	
opposition.	 These	murders	 strengthened	 criticism	 of	 the	 State’s	 ineffectiveness	 in	 controlling	
crime	and	especially	violent	crime.	
	
During	these	years,	security	policy	was	guided	by	various	short‐term	actions.	One	of	them	was	
the	deployment	of	a	civilian‐military	operation	called	the	‘Homeland	Security	Plan’.	The	plan	was	
implemented	as	a	replacement	for	the	hardening	of	components	of	the	Great	Mission	of	All	Life	
Venezuela.	 The	 plan	 was	 developed	 by	 the	 Public	 Safety	 and	 the	 National	 Armed	 Bolivarian	
Forces	and	aimed	to	strengthen	control	points	and	expand	the	areas	of	surveillance	and	patrols	
in	the	most	dangerous	urban	areas,	spreading	extensive	police	tactics	in	the	form	of	short‐term	
operations.	This	represented	a	return	to	prominence	of	the	military	in	public	security,	the	role	of	
which	had	been	progressively	eradicated	through	police	reforms	in	the	government	which	began	
in	2006	and	continued	over	the	course	of	President	Chávez	tenure.	
	
Another	action	in	2014	was	the	Pacifying	Plan	aimed	at	fighting	criminality	by	creating	strategic	
plans,	 informed	 by	 public	 consultation,	which	were	 aimed	 at	 developing	 the	 policies	 already	
mentioned.	These	included,	among	others,	the	disarmament	plan;	the	strengthening	of	the	Peace	
and	Life	Movement;	the	development	of	organizational	strategies	and	activation	of	youth	around	
sports	and	culture;	the	development	of	safe	and	peaceful	spaces;	and	social	discipline	in	prisons	
(Ministerio	del	Poda	Popular	para	la	Comunicación	y	la	Información	2014).	
	
However	 to	 date	 no	 official	 figures	 have	 been	 published	 that	 show	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
implemented	plans,	nor	official	statistics	on	the	movements	 in	the	rates	of	crime.	Government	
spokesmen	claim	that	the	homicide	rate	dropped	to	39	per	100,000	inhabitants;	however	the	data	
are	disputed	by	anti‐government	bodies,	such	as	 the	Venezuelan	Violence	Observatory,	which	
Martha	Lía	Grajales,	María	Lucrecia	Hernández:	Chavism	and	Criminal	Policy	in	Venezuela,	1999‐2014	
	
IJCJ&SD						180	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(1)	
indicates	a	rate	of	79	homicides	per	100,000	inhabitants.	It	has	to	be	said,	however,	that	these	
data	also	lack	detail	and	sources	to	prove	their	reliability	(Noticias	24	2014).	
	
During	this	period	there	were	no	reforms	in	the	field	of	criminal	procedures.	However	in	2013,	in	
the	area	of	criminal	law,	the	so‐called	Special	Law	to	Prevent	and	Punish	Torture	and	other	Cruel,	
Inhuman	 and	 Degrading	 Acts	 was	 adopted,	 which	 had	 been	 an	 outstanding	 obligation	 since		
Venezuela	had	become	a	signatory	to	the	United	Nations’	Convention	against	Torture	and	Other	
Cruel,	Inhuman	and	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment	(Gaceta	Oficial	2013b).	A	commission	for	
the	promotion	and	monitoring	of	preventative	policies	against	torture	was	created	and	the	Law	
for	Disarmament	and	Arms	Control	and	Ammunition	was	also	promulgated	(Gaceta	Oficial	2013a).	
	
During	2014	the	partial	reform	of	the	Organic	Law	on	the	Right	of	Women	to	a	Life	Free	of	Violence	
was	approved,	 in	 recognition	of	 the	demands	of	 the	women’s	movement.	The	reform	entailed	
femicide	being	incorporated	as	a	crime	(Gaceta	Oficial	2014b).	In	the	same	year	the	Organic	Law	
of	Fair	Prices	was	promulgated	in	order	to	regulate	the	fair	pricing	of	goods	and	services,	as	a	
means	of	controlling	the	economic	situation	(Gaceta	Oficial	2014a).	Additionally,	prison	terms	of	
1‐14	 years	 for	 some	 offenses	were	 established.	 So	 the	 normative	 approach	 trended	 towards	
punitiveness,	but	not	 in	the	sense	of	 increasing	the	penalties	 for	common	crimes.	Rather	they	
adhered	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 particular	 sectors,	 such	 as	 social	 movements	 and	 human	 rights	
organizations,	 and	 those	 seeking	punishments	 in	order	 to	persecute	behavior	 that	 threatened	
economic	stability.	
	
In	 2013	 the	 prison	 population	 stood	 at	 50,365,	 equivalent	 to	 a	 rate	 of	 169	 per	 100,000	
inhabitants.	 By	 August	 2014	 the	 prison	 population	 accounted	 for	 52,099	 people	 with	 an	
incarceration	rate	of	172	per	100,000	inhabitants.5	This	reflects	a	trend,	commencing	in	2007,	
towards	greater	use	of	imprisonment	in	response	to	crime,	a	trend	to	which	the	police	operations	
have	undoubtedly	contributed.	
	
Concluding	summation	
During	 the	 first	 stage	 (1999‐2000)	 governmental	 policies	 were	 concentrated	 around	 social	
inclusion	programs	which	aimed	to	reduce	poverty,	unemployment	and	inequality.	In	the	field	of	
criminal	law,	by	virtue	of	the	new	constitution,	the	penitentiary	system	prioritized	non‐liberty	
depriving	 forms	 of	 punishment.	 Additionally,	 the	 procedural	 system	 moved	 from	 being	
inquisitorial	to	being	adversarial,	establishing	trial	in	freedom	as	a	rule.	This	quickly	brought	with	
it	a	significant	decrease	in	detainees,	incarceration	rates	and	overcrowding	of	the	prison	system.	
But	the	developments	failed	to	resist	the	growing	discourse	that	related	the	increase	of	violent	
crime	to	the	new	procedural	benefits	proposed	by	the	OCCP,	the	new	legal	instrument,	which	led	
to	punitive	reforms	in	2000.	
	
In	the	second	phase	(2001‐2005)	a	punitive	shift	occurred	and	a	more	regressive	and	punitive	
reform	 to	 the	OCCP	 than	 the	 reform	 in	2000	was	adopted	 in	2001.	This	 initiative,	which	was	
approved	by	a	National	Assembly	with	a	Chavist	party	majority,	restricted	the	possibilities	of	trial	
in	 freedom,	extended	 the	application	of	preventive	detention	and	 limited	alternative	 forms	of	
sentence	enforcement.	Additionally,	the	Penal	Code	was	modified,	new	criminal	offenses	were	
created,	penalties	were	increased,	and	alternative	non‐liberty	restricting	punishment	measures	
were	restricted	for	some	crimes.	These	reforms	did	not	significantly	affect	the	incarceration	rate	
but	did	increase	the	percentage	of	preventive	detainees	in	the	system.		
	
The	third	stage	(2006‐2012)	is	characterized	by	hyperactivity	in	the	legislative	area	resulting	
from	four	criminal	procedure	reforms	to	the	OCCP.	The	reforms	aimed	to	ease	the	procedural	
delays	and	the	subsequent	overcrowding	of	prisons,	but	did	not	change	the	scope	of	preventive	
detention	and	limited	the	access	to	alternative	punishment	measures	for	those	who	were	already	
convicted.	The	2012	reform	draws	the	attention	because,	on	one	hand,	 it	seems	to	extend	the	
Martha	Lía	Grajales,	María	Lucrecia	Hernández:	Chavism	and	Criminal	Policy	in	Venezuela,	1999‐2014	
	
IJCJ&SD						181	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(1)	
conditional	(probationary)	suspension	of	criminal	proceedings	and	that	of	criminal	proceedings	
by	principle	of	prosecutorial	discretion	but,	on	the	other	hand,	it	tightened	the	requirements	to	
access	work	outside	institutions,	the	open	prison	regime	and	parole.	
	
A	shift	to	the	left	–	but	also	counterturns	–	occurred	during	this	period.	On	the	one	hand,	there	
was	police	 reform	characterized	by	 the	 creation	 of	 policing	 standards,	 the	 establishment	of	 a	
governing	body	in	the	field,	the	creation	of	a	university	to	form	State	Security	Organs,	and	the	
issuing	of	an	integral	public	policy	in	terms	of	citizen	security.	But,	on	the	other	hand,	measures	
were	 implemented	 that	 prioritized	 crime	 control	 through	 the	 installation	 of	 checkpoints	 in	
economically	 disadvantaged	urban	 areas.	This	 explains	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 incarceration	 rate,	
noting	a	significant	increase	from	87	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	2008,	to	150	per	100,000	in	2010.	
	
Whereas	 substantial	 improvements	 of	 social	 conditions	 meant	 that	 poverty	 and	 inequality	
continued	to	decline,	the	homicide	rate	continued	to	climb.	Antillano	(2004)	explains	that,	despite	
the	 implementation	 of	 redistributive	 social	 policies,	 they	were	 not	 able	 to	 totally	 reverse	 the	
causes	of	exclusion.	This	led	to	inequalities	and	the	widening	of	social	gaps	amongst	the	working	
class,	which	indirectly	caused	tension	while	eroding	the	bonds	of	class	and	community,	leading	
to	situations	of	violence	and	conflict	(Antillano	2014:	10).	
	
The	fourth	stage	(2013‐2014)	is	characterized	by	policies	aimed	to	reduce	political	conflicts	as	
a	 reaction	 to	 undemocratic	 attempts	 by	 the	 opposition	 to	 destabilize	 and	 delegitimize	 the	
government.	 Criminal	 laws,	 which	 were	 introduced	 in	 terms	 of	 security	 policy,	 focused	 on	
creating	a	solution	to	these	problems	by	defining	economic	crimes	and	installing	safety	measures	
to	contain	crime.	
	
At	this	stage	a	shift	occurred	in	the	orientation	of	the	new	policing	model.	A	plan	was	unfolded	
that	combined	checkpoints	and	patrols	deployed	by	the	police	and	armed	forces,	but	which	in	
practice	had	a	strong	militaristic	orientation.	The	murder	and	incarceration	rates	continued	to	
rise	due	to	the	selective	nature	of	the	safety	measures	implemented	among	the	working	class	and	
which	favored	the	prosecution	of	‘petty’	crime.	
	
The	orientation	of	social	policies	was	maintained	but	a	small	setback	was	recorded	due	to	the	
economic	situation	facing	the	country.	In	relation	to	inequality	during	this	period	a	decrease	in	
the	Gini	coefficient	–	the	index	of	income	inequality	where	a	value	of	zero	represents	absolute	
equality	 and	 a	 value	 of	 100	 absolute	 inequality	 –	 from	 0.404	 in	 2012	 to	 0.382	 in	 2014	was	
recorded	(Figure	10)	and	this	improvement	can	still	be	observed	at	the	time	of	writing.	
	
We	conclude	with	a	summary	of	our	observations.	In	terms	of	social	and	economic	matters	the	
orientation	 of	 the	 Chavist	 Government	was	 characterized	 by	 a	 sharp	 turn	 to	 the	 political	 left	
which	 deconstructed	 the	 prevailing	 neoliberal	 orientation	 that	 had	 prevailed	 until	 that	 time.	
However,	this	did	not	translate	into	criminal	policy,	which	was	generally	immersed	in	profound	
contradictions.	For	instance,	criminal	policy	at	times	showed	attempts	to	move	towards	a	position	
of	 guaranteeing	 civil	 liberties	 and	at	 other	 times	 seemed	 to	drive	 toward	punitive	hardening.	
Criminal	and	security	policies	were,	during	most	of	this	period,	a	subsidiary	subject,	little	studied	
and	addressed,	acting	reactively	to	specific	problems	that	sought	to	restructure,	often	through	
punitive	appeal.	
	
The	periods	during	which	the	main	punitive	orders	were	presented	were	the	second	and	fourth	
stages	identified	in	this	work.	These	periods	also	correspond	with	the	highest	levels	of	political	
conflict	and	were	marked	by	attempts	to	create	an	institutional	breakdown	fostered	by	parts	of	
the	political	opposition.	All	the	shifts	that	can	be	identified	in	the	four	stages	reflect	tensions	about	
the	orientation	of	crime	control	policy	within	the	Chavist	movement,	in	which	the	circumstantial	
dominance	of	punitive	positions	and	positions	of	civil	liberties	guarantees	have	not	been	able	to	
consolidate	and	maintain	permanent	positions.	
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Figure	10:	Gini	coefficient	in	Venezuela,	1997‐2014	
Note	(a):	This	is	a	measurement	of	income	inequality	where	a	value	of	zero	represents	absolute	equality	
and	a	value	of	100	absolute	inequality	
Note	(b):	Data	refers	to	the	first	semester	of	each	year		
Source:	Household	sample	survey	–	National	Institute	of	Statistic,	INE	
	
The	most	progressive	discourse	within	the	State	was	that	of	President	Chávez	and	 that	of	 the	
Public	Prosecutor’s	Office.	In	contrast,	the	most	conservative	discourse	was	held	by	the	National	
Assembly	 and	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 which	 prompted	 more	 conservative	 trends	 and	 called	 for	
tougher	penalties	and	imprisonment,	by	restriction	of	alternative	punishment	measures	and	the	
expansion	of	preventive	detention.	The	public	discourse	of	President	Chávez	was	always	aimed	
at	decreasing	punitive	measures	and	even	came	to	outline	a	sort	of	penal	abolitionism.	Chávez	
reclaimed	 the	use	of	 social	 inclusion	 strategies	 in	order	 to	 improve	 the	conditions	 that	 led	 to	
crime	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 making	 prisons	 more	 humane	 was	 like	 humanizing	 capitalism.	
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 his	 presidency	 he	 appealed	 to	 socio‐cultural	 factors	 as	 causes	 of	 youth	
violence,	while	identifying	consumerism,	individualism	and	selfishness	as	motivations	to	resort	
to	crime.	Nevertheless,	levels	of	violence	remained	on	the	rise	even	though	there	were	substantial	
improvements	of	social	conditions	based	on	the	reduction	of	poverty,	exclusion	and	inequality.	
This	made	it	harder	to	explain	how	these	conditions	were	directly	associated	with	the	causes	of	
crime.	
	
In	recent	years	the	issue	of	security	gained	a	more	important	position	in	the	Chavist	discourse,	
until	it	became	the	main	point	on	President	Nicolas	Maduro’s	agenda.	Maduro	stressed	the	need	
to	 take	 action	 against	 insecurity	 and	 crime	 in	 his	 first	 term	by	 increasing	police	 and	military	
operations	and	control	measures	in	high‐crime	areas.	
	
The	 incarceration	rate	 increases	mainly	with	 indicted	 individuals	and,	even	though	crime	and	
violence	continue	to	rise,	policy	makers	generally	do	not	question	the	effectiveness	and	relevance	
of	 the	 indiscriminate	 use	 of	 imprisonment.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 explained	 by	 the	 high	 electoral	
political	 costs	 involved	 in	 betting	 on	 less	 coercive	measures	 in	 the	 area	 of	 criminal	 law	 and	
security	in	the	context	of	a	Venezuelan	society	where	violence,	insecurity	and	crime	are	major	
concerns	in	people´s	daily	lives.	
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1	To	correspond	with	authors,	email	martha_lia@yahoo.com.	Neyda	Peña	and	Bárbara	Tineo	participated	as	assistants	
in	this	research.	
2	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
3	The	opposition,	which	remained	a	minority	force	during	this	period,	assumed	a	supportive	attitude	of	the	2001	OCCP	
reform	proposed	by	the	Chavist	movement.	
4	The	poverty	rate	in	2011	stood	at	31.6	per	cent,	almost	20	per	cent	lower	than	in	1998,	when	it	was	50.4	per	cent;	
and	the	Gini	index	stood	at	0.39,	a	decrease	of	nearly	a	point	from	the	0.48	reported	in	1998.	
5	The	data	about	the	prison	population	were	provided	by	the	Ministerio	del	Poda	Popular	para	el	Servicio	Penitenciario.	
The	reference	about	year	2014	only	accounts	for	data	until	August.	
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